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On the evening of March 30, 2026, Hainan Drinda New Energy Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as &#34;Drinda&#34;, 002865.SZ) released its annual report for 2025.
The report shows that the company achieved an operating income of 7.627 billion yuan in 2025, a year-on-year decline of 23.36%; the net profit attributable to shareholders of the listed company was -1.416 billion yuan, with the loss amount expanding by 139.51% year-on-year. This marks the second consecutive year the company has fallen into a loss since its full transformation to the photovoltaic battery business in 2022, with the loss amount deepening sharply.
This report clearly reflects the true situation of this photovoltaic enterprise, once hailed as a &#34;model of cross-industry transformation,&#34; under the industry's winter.
Transitioning from automotive trim to photovoltaic batteries, Drinda once wrote a capital myth with a nearly tenfold increase in market value. However, as the industry cycle turned and compounded by multiple challenges in its strategy and governance, the former &#34;top student&#34; is facing severe tests.
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<li>Performance Decline and Financial Dilemma: Survival Challenges in the Industry Cycle</li>
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Drinda's performance in 2025 can be described as a &#34;cliff-like decline.&#34; The comprehensive deterioration of core financial data reveals the immense pressure the company is under during the industry's deep adjustment period.
In 2025, the company's operating income was 7.627 billion yuan, down 23.36% from 9.952 billion yuan in 2024, and more than 11 billion yuan lower compared to the peak of 18.657 billion yuan in 2023.
Even more severe is that in 2025, Drinda's overall sales gross margin was -1.33%, with the gross margin of the company's core product, photovoltaic cells, turning negative for the first time, dropping to -1.65%, a year-on-year decrease of 2.13 percentage points. This means that the sales price of the company's battery products can no longer cover production costs, falling into a situation of &#34;losing more as it sells more.&#34; Looking at it quarterly, the losses show an expanding trend, especially in the fourth quarter, where the single-quarter loss reached 999 million yuan, almost contributing to the majority of the annual loss.
At the same time, the company's losses have intensified, and cash flow has deteriorated. In 2025, Drinda's net profit attributable to shareholders of the listed company was a loss of 1.416 billion yuan, with the net profit loss after deducting non-recurring gains and losses deepening to 1.640 billion yuan. The net cash flow from operating activities turned from a net inflow of 654 million yuan in 2024 to a net outflow of 486 million yuan, a significant year-on-year decrease of 174.23%. This change indicates that the company is not only facing accounting losses but also experiencing severe issues with its main business's &#34;blood generation&#34; capability.
A large-scale asset impairment provision is one of the direct reasons for the expanded losses. In 2025, the company made a total impairment provision of 437 million yuan for various assets, including 266 million yuan for fixed assets, 119 million yuan for inventory, and 53 million yuan for goodwill
This reflects that against the backdrop of rapid iteration of photovoltaic technology and continuous decline in product prices, some of the company's older or inefficient production lines and inventory are facing pressure from value depreciation. Over the past three years, the company has accumulated impairment provisions amounting to 1.653 billion yuan, continuously eroding the company's profits.
As of the end of 2025, the company's debt-to-asset ratio reached 77.69%, further increasing compared to the end of the previous year. Short-term loans of 1.058 billion yuan and non-current liabilities due within one year of 2.151 billion yuan totaled 3.209 billion yuan, while at the end of the period, cash and cash equivalents of 4.411 billion yuan included 1.461 billion yuan of restricted funds, leaving limited actual available funds. High financial expenses (interest expenses of 273 million yuan) further exacerbated the profit pressure.
In addition, the company's actual guarantee balance totaled 5.172 billion yuan, accounting for 141.31% of the net assets attributable to the parent company, of which the guarantee balance provided for guaranteed entities with a debt-to-asset ratio exceeding 70% reached 4.533 billion yuan, posing a significant potential compensation risk.
The high debt ratio and substantial external guarantees hang over the company like the &#34;Sword of Damocles&#34;; if cash flow further deteriorates or risks arise from guaranteed parties, it could trigger a serious financial crisis.
On the other hand, the company's R&amp;D investment amount is expected to decrease by 44.35% year-on-year in 2025, and the number of R&amp;D personnel has sharply reduced from 1,348 in 2023 to 324 by the end of 2025. In the rapidly evolving photovoltaic industry, the contraction of R&amp;D investment may weaken its long-term competitiveness.
II. From betting on photovoltaics to concept speculation: The &#34;space photovoltaic&#34; concept surged by 200%
The development history of Drinda is a microcosm of the transition from traditional manufacturing to the new energy track, struggling to survive in the industry cycle.
The company was originally engaged in automotive plastic interior and exterior trim parts and was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2017. In the context of sluggish growth in traditional business and declining net profits for consecutive years, Lu Xiaohong, who took over as chairman in 2019, led the transformation towards the photovoltaic industry. In 2021, the company acquired a 51% stake in photovoltaic battery company Jietai Technology for 1.434 billion yuan, officially entering the photovoltaic track; in 2022, it further acquired the remaining 49% stake for 1.519 billion yuan, achieving full ownership and completely divesting its original automotive trim business.
This acquisition, viewed by outsiders as &#34;a snake swallowing an elephant,&#34; achieved great success under the backdrop of high prosperity in the photovoltaic industry at the time. In 2022 and 2023, the company's net profits reached 716 million yuan and 816 million yuan, respectively, and its stock price surged more than 20 times from the low point in 2021, with a market value exceeding 40 billion yuan, becoming a star case of cross-industry transformation.
However, subsequently, amid industry reshuffling and consolidation due to overcapacity, the photovoltaic industry entered a &#34;cold winter&#34; period. In the face of fierce &#34;involution&#34; in the domestic photovoltaic industry, Drinda shifted its strategic focus to overseas markets. By 2025, the company's overseas sales revenue reached 3.864 billion yuan, a significant year-on-year increase of 62.83%, with the proportion of total revenue rising from 23.85% in 2024 to 50.66%
To support overseas capacity construction and global layout, the company successfully listed on the main board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in May 2025, becoming the first enterprise in the photovoltaic industry to achieve &#34;A+H&#34; dual-platform listing, raising a net amount of approximately HKD 1.29 billion. However, the Hong Kong stock listing did not reverse the performance decline, and the stock price faced a drop shortly after the listing, with this financing being viewed more as a measure to alleviate liquidity pressure amid continuous losses.
Against the backdrop of ongoing losses in its main business, the company launched a new story of &#34;space photovoltaic&#34; from the end of 2025 to early 2026. The company announced an investment of 30 million yuan to acquire a stake in Shanghai Xingyi Xinneng Technology Co., Ltd., focusing on photovoltaic applications in the low-orbit satellite and space computing industry. Although the company clearly stated that the relevant technology is still in the research and development stage and the business model has uncertainties, this concept sparked a frenzy in the capital market, with the company's stock price rising by over 200% in two months.
Interestingly, just as the stock price soared due to concept speculation, the company's controlling shareholder, Hainan Jindi Technology Investment Co., Ltd. (controlled by the Yang family), announced a reduction plan in January 2026, intending to reduce its holdings by no more than 3% of the company's total share capital. Based on the stock price at that time, the cashing amount could reach approximately 780 million yuan. This &#34;precise&#34; timing of the reduction raised market doubts about the actual controller cashing out at a high position through concept speculation.
III. Under Family Control: Challenges Faced by the Third Generation of Successors
Drinda is a typical family-controlled enterprise. The actual controllers of the company are Yang Renyuan, Lu Xiaohong, and 7 other members of the Yang family, holding 15.90% of the company's shares through Hainan Jindi Technology Investment Co., Ltd., with Lu Xiaohong personally holding 1.81%.
In August 2025, the company completed a board of directors reshuffle, with the founder Yang Renyuan's grandson, Lu Xuyang, the son of Lu Xiaohong, taking over as chairman, marking the completion of the power transfer from the first generation to the third generation of the Yang family. In the new board of directors, members of the Yang family still occupy several key positions, presenting a highly concentrated family control model.
In recent years, the company's management has undergone frequent changes. In November 2025, Chief Financial Officer Huang Falian resigned due to personal work arrangements, and Zhou Xiaohui, with a background in investment and financing, took over. In March 2026, Securities Affairs Representative Chen Wei resigned, and Yin Xinyue took over. Previously, during the transformation process, with the divestment of the automotive business, the original executive team of the listed company was almost entirely replaced, with the management of Jietai Technology taking over operations.
The story of Drinda is a complex narrative about opportunities of the times, capital operations, and industry cycles. It once accurately seized the photovoltaic windfall, achieving a leap in market value and performance through a &#34;gamble-like&#34; acquisition. However, as the industry tide recedes, risks begin to emerge one by one.
Currently, the cycle of overcapacity and price decline in the photovoltaic industry has not yet ended, and the profit margin in the battery segment, which is the company's main business, has been severely compressed, making it extremely difficult to turn losses into profits in the short term. Although the proportion of overseas revenue has increased, the advancement of overseas projects (such as the Oman 5GW battery base) faces uncertainties due to international trade conditions, tariff policies, and geopolitical influences, and the gross profit margin in overseas markets has also significantly shrunk to 0.75%
The massive loss annual report for 2025 is not only a performance report but also a stress test of its business model's risk resistance capability and corporate governance level.
From a cross-border star to a troubled situation, the case of Drinda reminds investors that while pursuing high-growth tracks, they must calmly examine the intrinsic financial health, strategic sustainability, and regulatory compliance of the company. In the face of an industry adjustment that has yet to bottom out and its own heavy financial burden, whether Drinda can traverse the cycle and truly achieve the transformation from &#34;capital story&#34; to &#34;real business profit&#34; still requires time to provide an answer. (Produced by &#34;Wealth Management Weekly - Financial Affairs Exchange&#34;)

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Hainan Drinda New Energy Technology Co., Ltd. released its annual report for 2025, showing operating revenue of 7.627 billion yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 23.36%; net profit loss of 1.416 billion yuan, with the loss margin expanding by 139.51%. Since its transformation to the photovoltaic cell business in 2022, the company has incurred losses for two consecutive years, with losses worsening. The gross profit margin for 2025 is -1.33%, and the gross profit margin for the core product, photovoltaic cells, has turned negative for the first time, as sales prices cannot cover production costs, cash flow has deteriorated, and the company faces survival challenges

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With consecutive years of significant losses, how will the "third-generation successor" Lu Xuyang reshape Drinda's "blood-making" ability?