In 2025, losses exceed 200 million yuan.
<img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://inews.gtimg.com/om_bt/Of8ajoBmrkrJnJOt50XV7LrMwqWpnu4GyXjIIibRHi_QEAA/1000?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="Image" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://inews.gtimg.com/om_bt/Of8ajoBmrkrJnJOt50XV7LrMwqWpnu4GyXjIIibRHi_QEAA/1000"/><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://inews.gtimg.com/om_bt/Oa0gLdZDoQq3me3JqhEQm_KvJvvUienFsNe9d6m_9YJdkAA/641?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="Image" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://inews.gtimg.com/om_bt/Oa0gLdZDoQq3me3JqhEQm_KvJvvUienFsNe9d6m_9YJdkAA/641"/> Zhang Wei, Investor Network
At the beginning of April, the topic &#34;NAYUKI only has 62 stores left in Chengdu&#34; surged to the trending list, attracting dual attention from consumers and the capital market. A field visit by Investor Network found that NAYUKI's flagship store in Chengdu IFS has already closed, becoming a microcosm of its &#34;slimming down.&#34;
Data shows that NAYUKI will have a net closure of 152 stores in 2025. Unlike NAYUKI's proactive &#34;slimming down,&#34; other listed peers are still &#34;expanding.&#34; For example, Mixue Ice City will net increase over 13,000 stores in 2025, Gu Ming will net increase over 3,600 stores, Auntie Hu will net increase over 2,000 stores, and Cha Baidao will net increase over 200 stores.
In terms of total number of stores, NAYUKI is no longer in the same league as other listed peers. By the end of 2025, NAYUKI will have a total of 1,646 stores, while Bawang Chaji will have 7,453 stores, Cha Baidao will have 8,621 stores, and both Auntie Hu and Gu Ming will exceed 10,000 stores, with Mixue Ice City approaching 60,000 stores.
Currently, NAYUKI still retains two characteristics: direct operation and high-end positioning. However, according to the latest financial report, among the six newly listed tea beverage companies, only NAYUKI is expected to incur losses in 2025, while the other five are profitable. Since its listing in 2021, NAYUKI has accumulated losses exceeding 1.7 billion yuan. Under performance pressure, can NAYUKI still adhere to direct operation and high-end positioning? Perhaps only time will tell.
Landmark stores become examples of &#34;slimming down&#34;
Chengdu IFS, located above Chunxi Road subway station, boasts the famous &#34;Climbing Panda&#34; photo spot, with the starting point of Airport Bus No. 1 (to Tianfu Airport) nearby, and the ancient Daci Temple and shopping center Taikoo Li behind it. Its superior geographical location makes Chengdu IFS a must-compete area for major brands and keeps tourists lingering.
NAYUKI once set up two stores in Chengdu IFS, namely the Chengdu IFS store located at the intersection of Xiaokejia Alley and Hongxing Road Section 3, and the Guojin IFS PRO store located at IFS B1 109a (near subway exit D). Now, these two store locations can still be found on the map.

(NAYUKI Chengdu Mori Center Store, Investor Network Photo)
In April, Investor Network visited these two stores but found no trace of them. Investor Network discovered that next to the Chengdu IFS store (original site) are brands like Descente, Chanel, and Figlamu, while next to the Guojin IFS PRO store (original site) are competitors like Heytea and Tea Master. At the original site of the Guojin IFS PRO store, a coffee brand starting with M is currently under renovation, with a sign saying &#34;Stay tuned.&#34;
However, the area around Chengdu IFS is not lacking in other new tea drink brands. In front of it, there is a long queue at the entrance of Bawang Chaji; walking 100 meters south, there are also stores of Cha Baidao and Mixue Bingcheng, both bustling with customers. After confirming with the staff at Chengdu IFS, Investor Network was informed that there is no NAYUKI store in this mall, but customers can walk a few hundred meters to Qun Guang Plaza to purchase or place an order directly through the mobile app.
According to reports from Sichuan Daily and others, NAYUKI's first PRO store in Chengdu, located in Fortune Plaza, has also recently closed. Information shows that NAYUKI began launching PRO stores, which differ from standard stores, at the end of 2020. In simple terms, PRO stores are smaller, require lower investment, have flexible locations, and achieve higher sales per unit area and net profit compared to standard stores. PRO stores were once highly anticipated by NAYUKI and were considered a key layout for its path to profitability.
Some analysts point out that the Chengdu IFS store, as an early high-end business district store for NAYUKI, carried the narrative of its brand's premium positioning; the Fortune Plaza store, as a benchmark for NAYUKI's exploration of lightweight store formats, has also closed, marking a potential phase adjustment for PRO stores.
NAYUKI has defined 2025 as an &#34;adjustment year,&#34; with the core goal of divesting inefficient assets and improving the quality of individual stores. Chengdu, as one of its core cities with a dense network of directly operated stores, has become a key area for store optimization. Among the more than 160 stores that NAYUKI plans to close nationwide by 2025 (not net closures), over 30% are in Chengdu, all of which are high-rent and low-efficiency stores. As of early April 2026, NAYUKI has only 62 stores left in Chengdu, with the net closure rate far exceeding the industry average in the fiercely competitive Chengdu market for new tea drinks.
However, NAYUKI's store closures are mainly concentrated in inefficient stores in core business districts and non-core areas, while the retention rate of stores in emerging business districts like High-tech Zone and Tianfu New Area is relatively high, reflecting NAYUKI's refined selection logic based on individual store profitability.
Additionally, with the rise of food delivery, consumers are more inclined towards convenient purchases, leading to a decrease in in-store consumption frequency. The premium ability of &#34;on-site consumption&#34; in core business districts has weakened, and the scene value of large store models does not match the cost investment, all of which may prompt NAYUKI to choose to close stores.
How long can direct operation and high-end sustain?
Currently, there are 6 new tea drink brands listed nationwide, of which 5 are listed in Hong Kong, in order of listing time: NAYUKI, Cha Baidao, Guming, Mixue Bingcheng, and Hu Shang Ayi; only Bawang Chaji is listed in the United States. Among the 6 new tea drinks, only NAYUKI primarily operates on a direct sales model, while the other 5 focus on franchising
However, NAYUKI is not entirely a direct-operated brand. As of April 2026, among NAYUKI's more than 1,600 stores, approximately 1,300 are directly operated, while over 300 are franchised. Among its listed peers, Gu Ming, Cha Bai Dao, Hu Shang A Yi, and Mi Xue Bing Cheng all have direct-operated ratios of less than 1%; Ba Wang Cha Ji is slightly higher, but still below 10%. Overall, NAYUKI has chosen a path that is different from the &#34;mainstream,&#34; being the only top new tea brand that insists on a direct-operated model.
Why does NAYUKI &#34;persist&#34; in the direct-operated model? It may be related to its brand positioning, long-term strategy, and the creation of a &#34;third-party space.&#34; However, whether this model aligns with the current environment remains questionable.
According to data, NAYUKI's first store opened in November 2015 in Shenzhen, aiming to provide a lifestyle experience of &#34;a cup of good tea and a bite of soft European bread&#34; through its dual-category model of &#34;tea + soft European bread&#34; and a comfortable social space.
This places high demands on quality control. It is well known that the franchising model may lead to varying levels of franchisees, resulting in inconsistent flavors, while direct operation ensures that the quality of tea and the taste of soft European bread in each store meet uniform standards. On the other hand, the comfortable social space is similar to Starbucks' &#34;third space,&#34; providing a pleasant social environment. Direct operation facilitates the headquarters' management of store layout and decoration style, preventing image fragmentation caused by franchising.
Perhaps based on the above two considerations, NAYUKI has chosen a business strategy that primarily focuses on direct operation with supplementary franchising. However, direct operation also comes with significant cost pressures, mainly including rent and labor costs. In contrast, under the franchising model, these two &#34;big expenses&#34; do not need to be managed by the new tea brand operators. Therefore, with the expansion of franchise stores, by 2025, new tea brands primarily based on franchising could earn profits of hundreds of millions or even billions.
In addition to direct operation, NAYUKI also has a label of having once been positioned as a high-end brand. It is referred to as &#34;once&#34; because, based on the trend of customer unit prices in recent years, NAYUKI's high-end positioning may no longer be sustainable.
Data shows that from 2017 to 2020, NAYUKI became a high-end benchmark in the new tea beverage market with its differentiated products of &#34;freshly made fruit tea + freshly baked soft European bread,&#34; combined with immersive experiences in core business districts and high-end social scene positioning, maintaining a customer unit price stable between 35 yuan and 45 yuan. In 2022, NAYUKI began implementing a &#34;price-for-volume&#34; strategy, with customer unit prices dropping below 34 yuan, and some stores launched low-priced series. By 2025, NAYUKI's customer unit price is expected to drop to 24.4 yuan. It can be seen that maintaining high-end status is becoming difficult, and it must participate in price wars.
Whether NAYUKI's customer unit price will further decline in the future is still uncertain. Currently, at least two trends may force it to continue lowering prices. On one hand, changes in consumer habits, with the popularity of takeout and market education from coffee brands like Luckin, have reduced consumer demand for &#34;in-store drinking&#34; and &#34;third spaces.&#34; On the other hand, the deep-rooted perception of &#34;9.9 yuan&#34; per cup and the low-price strategies of peers like Mi Xue Bing Cheng may also prompt further price reductions
According to data from Meituan, the average customer unit price for new tea drinks nationwide is 10.5 yuan, with consumption trends leaning towards cost-effectiveness. Additionally, about 74% of consumers are willing to pay between 11 yuan and 20 yuan. Only a few premium tea drinks have a unit price above 25 yuan, but this type of product has a specific audience and faces challenges in reaching lower-tier markets.
For example, Heytea has set its unit price above 25 yuan, but to adapt to the market, it has also launched low-priced new products below 10 yuan. Looking at the trend of Nayuki's unit price dropping to 24.4 yuan in 2025, it is also possible that they will introduce affordable products to cater to the market and attract more consumers into stores.
The pressure to &#34;turn losses into profits&#34; remains, and a breakthrough is needed.
Currently, Nayuki's most pressing issue is still its long-term losses. The performance announcement released in March shows that Nayuki achieved a revenue of 4.331 billion yuan in 2025, a year-on-year decrease of 12%, with a net loss of 241 million yuan for the year, narrowing the loss margin by 74% compared to 2024.
Nayuki stated that the decline in revenue is mainly due to the active contraction of stores (reducing 165 directly operated stores). Although optimizing the single-store profit model by closing inefficient stores has led to a rebound in daily sales per store, it has not fundamentally solved Nayuki's profitability problem.
In contrast to Nayuki, the other five listed peers all achieved profitability in 2025. Among them, Mixue Ice Cream earned 5.927 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 33%; Guming earned 2.575 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 67%; Cha Baidao earned 821 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 71%; Auntie Hu in Shanghai earned 501 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 52%; and Bawang Chaji earned 1.171 billion yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 53%. Except for Bawang Chaji's year-on-year decline in profit, the other four maintained high growth. In comparison, Nayuki has fallen behind.
Some analysts believe that Nayuki's primarily direct-operated model is inconsistent with the current situation, trapping it in a quagmire of losses. Additionally, the high threshold for franchising Nayuki has led to slow progress in its franchise business.
It is reported that Nayuki opened franchising in 2023, with the initial investment for franchisees at about 1 million yuan, significantly higher than its peers. In 2024, Nayuki will lower the franchise investment to a minimum of 580,000 yuan, still above the industry average. In 2025, Nayuki's net increase in franchise stores was only 13, a significant gap compared to Auntie Hu in Shanghai and Guming, which each added over 2,000 franchise stores.
Previous predictions suggested that Nayuki's number of franchise stores would experience explosive growth in 2026, but given the net closure of 152 stores in 2025 and the company's continued losses, it remains uncertain how many franchisees will dare to &#34;enter the market&#34; with relatively high franchise fees.
To turn losses into profits, Nayuki has explored other avenues. For example, in March of this year, Nayuki opened its first &#34;Xian·Studio&#34; store in Shenzhen, extending the consumption scenario from milk tea to brunch and afternoon tea, attempting to find new stories in the healthy tea drink sector, but the effectiveness of this remains to be observed
In addition, NAYUKI has also launched a bottled beverage business, with revenue in this segment projected to be 178 million in 2025, a year-on-year decline of 39%. Investor Network visited supermarkets such as Hongqi and Wudongfeng in Chengdu but did not find NAYUKI bottled beverages; the shelves for similar drinks were mainly occupied by products like Yuanqi Forest and Nongfu Spring. Given the ongoing losses, there is uncertainty about how much determination NAYUKI has to expand its bottled beverage business in the future.
Currently, the common strategy for growth in the new tea beverage industry is to go overseas. For example, Mixue Ice City has entered 14 countries, and Bawang Chaji's overseas GMV (Gross Merchandise Volume) reached 370 million in the fourth quarter of 2025, showing year-on-year growth for three consecutive quarters; Guming and Hu Shang Ayi are leveraging supply chain advantages to capture the Southeast Asian market.
However, overseas expansion has a key requirement: the supply chain. NAYUKI has only over 1,600 stores domestically, which is not advantageous compared to competitors with tens of thousands of stores. If it expands overseas, its supply chain may face even greater pressure. Regarding NAYUKI's overseas news, related reports only mentioned its layout in markets like Japan and Singapore, but no accurate data was found on the specifics.
NAYUKI's predicament is also reflected in its stock price. As of April 9, NAYUKI's stock price was less than 1 yuan, down over 95% from its listing in 2021. Meanwhile, the company's market value is less than 1.5 billion Hong Kong dollars, which is significantly lower compared to Mixue Ice City's over 100 billion Hong Kong dollars, Guming's over 60 billion Hong Kong dollars, and Bawang Chaji's 1.9 billion dollars.
What do you think about NAYUKI's future? Feel free to leave a message, comment, or share. (Produced by Siwei Finance)

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NAYUKI is facing a performance dilemma, with an expected loss of over 200 million yuan in 2025, net closing 152 stores, and reducing the total number of stores to 1,646. Compared to its peers, NAYUKI appears to be weak in market expansion, while other brands like Mixue Ice City are rapidly increasing their store count. Although NAYUKI insists on direct operation and a high-end positioning, it has accumulated losses of over 1.7 billion yuan since its listing in 2021, and whether it can maintain this strategy in the future remains to be seen

腾讯新闻 - 财经

ChinaAMC CSI Food & Beverage Sub-Industry ETF

Tianhong CSI Food and Beverage ETF

NAYUKI

Hwabao WP CSI Food & Beverage Sub-Industry ETF

China Merchants Guozheng Food and Beverage ETF

Huaan CSI SWS Food and Beverage ETF

NAYUKI "slims down": The performance dilemma and high-end positioning challenges behind store closures | [Field Research]