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John Hancock Pfd Income lll

HPS

12.8600.69% ( -0.090 )
Closed: Sep 15, 16:00:00 (EDT)
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John Hancock Pfd Income lll (HPS)

Open
12.980
High
12.980
Low
12.800
Prev. Close
12.950
Volume
123.85K
Turnover
1.60M
Avg Price
12.879
Bid/Ask Ratio
5.56%
Amplitude
1.39%
52wk High
14.383
Volume Ratio
2.71
Turnover Ratio
0.38%
52wk Low
12.800
Float Mkt Cap
413.69M
Dividend YieldTTM
10.26%
DividendTTM
1.32
NAV
--
NAV Date
--
Disc/Prem Rate
--
Total Issued
32.17M
Assets
413.69M
Min lot size
1
Currency
USD

News

  • prnewswire · Sep 1 at 08:23 PM

    16:15 ETJohn Hancock Closed-End Funds Declare Monthly Distributions

  • businessinsider · Jul 1 at 08:45 PM

    John Hancock Preferred Income Fund III declares $0.11 dividend

  • PR Newswire · Jun 1 at 08:24 PM

    JOHN HANCOCK CLOSED-END FUNDS DECLARE MONTHLY DISTRIBUTIONS

Posts

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Bullish vs. Bearish — Last 3 Months

127 followers · 0 opinions
SS
▲Bullish50%
50%Bearish▼
  • S
    SerenityApr 7 at 02:17 PM

    The nice thing about multi-year bottlenecks from:

    $HPS.A to $Sandisk(SNDK.US) to $Lumentum(LITE.US)

    Is that you can sleep a easier despite market volatility like today.

    Knowing demand will be extreme even 1 year...

    Even if Trump wants to nuke Bikini Bottom and other companies might be more impacted:

    -> One has a huge market share over Transformers

    -> One has huge market share over NAND

    -> One has huge market share over EML/OCS.

    And the one thing in common is that they're all likely backlogged on orders into 2028.

    Signaling near-guaranteed fundamental revenue and likely margin expansion into the next year.

    It's H1 2026 now.

    Source: Serenity

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  • S
    StockMarket.NewsOct 30, 2025 at 04:21 PM

    We have our fourth private credit collapse in two months, and this one shows exactly why institutional lenders shouldn't be trusted to verify their own collateral.

    Bankim Brahmbhatt ran Carriox Capital, a New York telecom financing outfit that convinced BlackRock's HPS Investment Partners and BNP Paribas to lend him $552.6 million. The entire deal was built on one claim: he had legitimate receivables from T-Mobile, Telstra, BICS, Telecom Italia Sparkle, and Taiwan Mobile backing the loans.​

    None of it was real. Brahmbhatt forged contracts that appeared to be signed by representatives from these carriers. He created fake invoices supposedly issued by these companies claiming they owed Carriox money. Then he spoofed email addresses mimicking these carriers' real domains and sent fake verification emails to make the receivables look legitimate. By stacking these fabricated invoices on top of each other, he created what looked like $500+ million in collateral. The lenders saw assets and funded the deal without catching any of it.​​

    Here's where it gets embarrassing. When HPS and BNP Paribas finally tried to verify these receivables by actually calling T-Mobile, the carrier said they had no idea what Carriox was talking about. No contracts. No invoices. Nothing existed. One phone call would have instantly revealed the entire fraud. These are supposed to be institutional-grade lenders with world-class risk management. Yet somehow they missed basic due diligence.​

    While all this was happening, Brahmbhatt's people were also stealing cash. Whenever payments came through the lender-controlled collection accounts, instead of applying those funds to the debt, they diverted the money offshore. So he wasn't just fabricating collateral. He was stealing actual cash flows in real time.​

    Lenders sued in August 2025 and froze all assets. Carriox filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy with $500 million to $1 billion in liabilities and basically zero assets remaining. HPS is sitting on $552.6 million in losses with nothing to recover against.​

    The kicker is BlackRock acquired HPS for $12 billion in July 2025 specifically to expand into private credit and get access to its $148 billion platform. Within 90 days of closing that deal, they're holding a half-billion dollar fraud loss on receivables that HPS supposedly vetted and monitored.​

    That's not just a bad deal. That's a massive question mark about whether one of the world's largest asset managers actually has the infrastructure to verify complex collateral in modern lending markets. If BlackRock's $12 trillion asset management machine can miss $500+ million in forged documents and fake invoices, what else are they missing? This is the systemic risk that should concern everyone.

    Source: StockMarket.News

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